Abstract

This article examines the theory of mind proposed by the esteemed Islamic philosopher, Mulla Sadra Shirazi, through a phenomenological lens. We specifically focus on how Mulla Sadra’s framework addresses the question of the individual human mind and its intricate relationship with the body. While Mulla Sadra presents concepts that resonate with some of Husserl’s ‘monadological-phenomenological’ reflections, we argue that strict adherence to phenomenological methodology precludes acceptance of the metaphysical implications he draws concerning the individual mind’s connection to the totality of existence, including a presumed divine reality. Nonetheless, our comparative analysis with Mulla Sadra’s thought illuminates key aspects of Husserlian monadology and highlights the limitations of a rigorously phenomenological approach to purely metaphysical inquiries.

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by Andrea Altobrando

In this article I try to illustrate the reasons why Husserl included such a metaphysically challenging concept as the monad in his phenomenology. I will first offer a brief historical reconstruction of that path that led Husserl to such an introduction, and then focus on some key features of the Husserlian monad (immortality and unbornness, epistemic substantiality, plurality of monads, and uniqueness of the objective world). I will finally turn to a reflection concerning the phenomenological tenability of Husserlian monadology and weigh its merits and shortcomings.

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